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I . Introduction 
Can conceptual analysis contribute to a physicalistic account 
of consciousness? Over time, there have been many objections 
to conceptual analysis, many of which might be due to the 
Quinean intuition against a priori analysis, and above all 
because conceptual analysis neglects the consideration of 
Kripkean possible worlds. 
David Chalmers(l996) and Frank jackson(l994, 1998) 
proposed a new version of conceptual analysis providing 
reductive explanation, one that allowed conceptual analysis to 
be evaluated by Kripkean possible worlds. Their intention is 
that if a priori analysis includes the consideration of possible 
worlds, then it functions like a rigid designator. If a conceptual 
analysis of consciousness is a kind of rigid designator, 
consciousness is reduced to the conceptual analysis of it, since 
the necessary reductive explanation of consciousness by 
conceptual analysis is gained. Physicalists, for example, must 
explain consciousness in this way. The goal of this paper is to 
* This paper is based on arguments from some chapters of my MA thesis 
passed in Nov. 2000. 
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evaluate whether or not the new version of conceptual analysis 
which Chalmers and jackson(C&J) proposed is tenable by 
examining the objections of Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker 
(B&S) to their views. 
II. The Battle: C&J vs. B&S 
1. Conceptual Analysis and Two-Dimensional 
Framework of lntension(TDFI) 
C&J hold that if physicalists want to admit the existence of 
consciousness and give complete explanations, they need 
logical supervenience. I l Logical supervenience is the thesis that 
if there are logically possible worlds that contain physical 
duplicates indiscernible from us, then these duplicates m those 
worlds necessarily have the same consciousness that we have. 
Although some have asked them why we must hold logical 
supervenience which seems too strict for physicalism, they 
answer that weaker superveniences than the logical one, for 
instance natural or contingent supervenience, leave the over 
and above (Chalmers 1996) and that some of them are 
compatible even with Cartesian dualism(Jackson 1998. 11-12). 
C&J believe that logical supervenience needs conceptual 
I) Jackson mentioned only global supervenience( F. Jackson 1994, 1998). 
But his assertion is that physicalism needs the a priori necessity that 
includes the Kripkean necessity and global supervenience with 
Kripkean necessity is indeed not different from logical necessity that 
Chalmers supports. Chalmers thinks that Jackson's global 
supervenience with the requirement of minimal physical duplicate is the 
same as his(global) logical supervenience(Chalmers, D. 1996, 42). In this 
paper, I ignore the difference between global supervenience and local 
one. 
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analysis evaluated through possible worlds; furthermore, they 
also contend that this new version of conceptual analysis 
escapes the critique from Kripkean intuition. They tried to 
show their claim with two-dimensional framework of intension 
(TDFD, a system that uses two features of intension. In the 
Fregean theory of reference, intension denotes its referent by 
meaning, and the relation between intension and its referent is 
regarded as a kind of function. For example, the intension of 
the morning star, brightly shining in the east sky before the 
dawn, denotes Venus, and this denotation is regarded as a 
functional one. C&J noticed that if we combine Kripkean 
possible worlds with the Fregean theory of reference, intension 
can be specified as a function from possible worlds to the 
referent. Importantly, two facts in the Kripkean theory of rigid 
designator can make two different intensions possible: the fact 
that the referential relation 1s determined m the actual world 
and that once the relation is determined in this world, it 1s 
preserved through counterfactual worlds. 
Therefore, we have two divided dimensions: primary 
intension having the referent determined a priori in this world 
and secondary intension having its referent determined 
counterfactually. Primary intension corresponds to the intension 
from the descriptive theory of reference. For example, primary 
intension of water is the watery (or waterish) stuff, which 
refers to a material that fills rivers, lakes, and the ocean; it 
has no color, no taste, and no scent; and it quenches thirst. In 
a word, such material performs the water role and the 
macroscopic properties of water are entailed a priori by the 
concept of water. On the other hand, secondary intension 
stems from the causal theory in which secondary intension of 
water is H20. Once the microscopic properties of water are 
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certified causally by science, the identity between water and 
HzO becomes metaphysically necessary. 
TDFI is the system with those two dimensions of intension 
and also two parameters. One parameter is determined in this 
world by meaning while the other IS determined 
counterfactually by the context of evaluation. With combining 
two parameters, TDFI enables two dimensions of intension to 
become integrated. For this, the fact that in this world, the 
referent of primary intension of water is the same as that of 
secondary intension is critical. Once this fact is certified 
empirically in the central world,2l the world that is chosen 
among possible worlds, primary intension is determined just 
like secondary intension, and it plays the role of rigid 
designator. 
C&]' s main argument is that if the empirical facts that HzO 
fills 70% of a person, and the watery stuff fills 70% of a 
person are combined with a priori fact that water is the 
watery stuff, the inference to the conclusion that water fills 
70% of a person becomes correct. Thus, the a priori analysis 
that water is the occupant of the water role is rigidified and 
entailed by microscopic physical facts(Jackson 1994). At first, 
Kripke discerned sharply metaphysical a posteriori necessity 
from conceptual a priori necessity. However, C&J took only 
the context and semantics to evaluate counterfactually from 
the Kripkean rigid designator and applied them to a priori 
analysis. 
Once primary intension is given and its identity with 
secondary intension is certified in this world, TDFI enables us 
2) For us, the central world is our world, while the Mars for Martian. 
Is Conceptual Analysis Still Sustainable? 265 
to infer macroscopic properties of water from microphysical 
facts. This theory about primary intension is a new version of 
conceptual analysis. In C&J' s physicalism, logical necessity of 
primary intension gained from TDFI plays a crucial role; if 
primary intension is compatible with Kripkean possible worlds, 
there is little reason to deny the new version of conceptual 
analysis for physicalism. This new verston will lead 
physicalists to reductive explanation by means of logical 
supervenience. For example, if there is any conceptual analysis 
of consciousness, consciousness will be reduced to it with the 
help of TDFI. 
Kind of 
Kind of Intension 
Reference 
The Necessary Primary 
Intension, Two-Dimensional 
Intension. 
Primary A Priori, (Conceptual Analysis is 
intension Conceptual Projection to rigidified counterfactually, 
Possible Worlds if it lS identified with 
secondary intension in 
the actual world.) 
Secondary A Posteriori, ~ The Necessary Secondary 
intension Causal Intension 
Figure 1. Two-Dimensional Framework of Intension 
2. B&S's Objection 
In C&J' s theory, we need two facts in order to rigidify the 
referent of primary intension and, thus, in order to deduce 
safely from HzO to macroscopic properties of water. One thing 
is a priori conceptual analysis such that which indicates that 
water is waterish stuff. Another fact is that in this world HzO 
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plays the role of waterish stuff. I.e., HzO 1s the occupant of 
the water role. Thus, we can a priori deduce from H:.>O to 
various macroscopic properties of water. Then, there might be 
two ways to stand against C&j' s framework: to deny the 
necessity of conceptual analysis; to reject the necessary 
relation between the water role and its occupant. 
B&S(1999) raised an objection to C&]' s physicalism. They 
want to show both that "water = the watery stuff" is not an 
a priori fact and that TDFI is unhelpful to conceptual analysis. 
Conceptual analyticity comes from the unique relationship 
between the stuff playing the water role and water. Of course, 
the water role is not exposed to us unless we meet water 
directly or are heard of that fact by causal chains. But once 
that fact is uniquely determined, it is regarded as an a priori 
one. Their main strategy is to take the first way mentioned 
above. So, they make up some counter~examples to tackle in 
the first necessity. 
Suppose Putnam's twin Earth, where XYZ~water seems to 
boil when heated. Assume that people in the twin Earth 
believe that their water boils. But, then, HD cannot boil, 
because boiling is a natural~kind term; for people on twin 
Earth, the behavior of HzO ~water on Earth is just pseudo~ 
boiling. This example is also expected to reveal that deduction 
from HzO to boiling is neither necessary nor a priori. Nothing 
prevents us from enjoying the conceivability of XYZ ~water 
and twin Earth's physics, so our water could not boil at all. 
Thus, whether HD boils or not depends on purely conceptual 
facts, but rather the world relative to empirical facts, such as 
environment and science in each world, determine it. This 
intuition plays a chief role in their critique. 
They also devised some counter~examples about the primary 
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intension to break out uniqueness. Firstly, is it possible that 
the world where Hi) and the watery stuff fills 70% of a 
person exists, but the word "liquid" refers to the solid stuff in 
our world?3l That is, is the liquid-solid inversion4l possible? In 
such a world, the conceptually analyzed proposition, "water is 
a liquid," is false. This tells us that there is no unique relation 
between water and the description of the cluster of 
macroscopic properties of water. Hence, the watery stuff is not 
a priori. If the liquid-solid inversion is possible, it entails the 
possibility that primary intension of liquid or solid is relative 
to the conceptual scheme of each world. For instance, we have 
the liquid watery stuff while our counterparts have the solid 
watery stuff, and the stuff in both worlds is HzO. So the point 
becomes that, regardless of using the terms "liquid" or "solid," 
the watery stuff picks up the referent which is related to each 
term. This example notifies us that the different conceptual 
scheme of each world depends on the science and the culture 
of each world. Then, the necessity of primary intension 
rigidified with TDFI appears unreliable. Because there are the 
elements of the natural kind even in words of folk physics 
such as liquid and solid, we should regard primary intension, a 
tem1 of folk semantics, as not a purely a priori intension, but 
rather a causal one. 
However, B&S retracted the first counter-example, since the 
liquid-solid inversion case was applied only to the definitions. 
Intension is not confined to the definition of the term such as 
liquid, solid, odorless, tasteless, etc. There is another similar 
3) Block and Stalnaker 1999. 31. 
4) Strictly speaking, this case is not an exact liquid-solid inversion, since 
there is no information about the term liquid in twin earth. But I'll call 
it the inversion for convenience' sake. 
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counter-example about the intension: is it possible that the 
counterfactual twin Earth is indiscernible micro-physically, but 
has another primary intension that denotes HD or has another 
stuff that primary intension of water refers to?5l The teaching 
of this example is the same as that of the liquid-solid 
inversion case. Although, in twin Earth, H_~O fills 70% of a 
person just like in our world, the fact that primary intension 
of water is H~O is false. So we can get two kinds of TDFI in 
each case: primary intension of our world and of twin Earth. 
That is, two kinds of TDFI depend on each central world: 
Earth and twin Earth. This counter-example also shows that 
the uniqueness of primary intension fails and that primary 
intension is relative to each world's science and culture, and, 
consequently, is not a priori. 
3. C&J's Reply: "That's All" and "Nothing But" 
C&J don't find B&S's attack damaging. They answered 
them, firstly, that a priori entailment is not confined at 
definitional analysis, and secondly, that their counter-examples 
were about negative facts which do not concern our world. 
The first reply applies to the examples of primary intension, 
and the other is about all cases raised by B&S. 
Chalmers0998) and C&J(2001) claimed that B&S's attack is 
applicable only to complaining about the impossibility of the 
unique definition of liquid or solid. Surely, many primary 
intensions have clear definitions, but as we see in the Gettier 
case, there may be no explicit definition of knowledge; 
nevertheless, we can get entailment of facts about it. Hence, 
5) This example is in Block and Stalnaker 1999, 37. Maybe, the inversion 
of primary intensions is possible, too. 
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we do not have to presuppose any definition for a priori 
entailments, and, in the end, TDFI is not flawed. Instead of 
the definition, Chalmers(1998) only needs intension and function 
from intension to the referent for conceptual analysis. 
Their next reply is more decisive. They assert that B&S' s 
examples are never real counter-examples. They claim that 
supervenience falls only under the facts about our world, and 
that there is a restriction that the duplicate of our world (twin 
Earth) must be the minimal duplicate. Chalmers(1996, 1998, 
2000) call this condition "That's all fact," and Jackson(2000) 
name it the "Nothing but" condition. So we only have to 
consider the facts of our world, and we need not consider the 
negative possibilities of worlds with facts other than ours. If 
the fact that liquid is solid and that HzO is not primary 
intension of water and that water is XYZ according to TDFI 
of twin Earth comes under negative possibility, B&S's 
counter-examples seem only prima facie. In fact, we need just 
our TDFI. 
m. Who Are Likely to Win the Battle? 
A result of the battle is that C&J' s reply is partly right but 
that B&S win overall. Rightly, C&J' s answer can exclude 
some counter-examples: some B&S' s examples are excluded 
by "That's all fact." Or, intension may not need exact 
definition. Nonetheless, a priori analysis by concept seems still 
vulnerable. 
Primary intension has two stages: stage one is to be defined 
analytically by concept or meaning; stage two is to be 
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evaluated through possible worlds. After passmg the test of 
two stages, TDFI fully utilizes a priori inference from Hi) to 
various properties of water. Each stage will be examined 
carefully and it will be argued that we are not entitled to have 
unique conceptual analysis. 
1. Descriptive Ascent 
C&] denied that primary intensions were definitions in 
nature and argued that B&S 's critique of undefinability was 
misleading. They asserted that the relevant meaning was 
intension - a kind of function from meaning to reference, and 
that meaning can be specified in order for it to be considered 
true or false even if it is not definable; the examples of 
knowledge supported his assertions. 
Of course, it is challenging to find exact definitions for 
them. But even if we cannot capture the exact definition, to 
evaluate that function we must have at least a specified 
condition when the value of a function is true. For instance, 
primary intension of water is specified by such a sentence: x 
is primary intension of water if and only if x denotes water 
by its meaning. 
The truth condition of the sentence is preserved analytically 
by meaning(Even though this sentence uses "meaning" to 
specify meaning, if we want to discern primary intension from 
secondary intension, this circulation of the term is unavoidable. 
The latter "meaning" means conceptual semantics, and the 
former "meaning" is a truth condition set forth by conceptual 
semantics). In this way, I want to give a general form that 
satisfies this condition and fits functionalism, the thesis used 
to explain something with the role between input and output. 
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If we modify the previous sentence a little, we can get the 
more general form: x is primary intension of y if and only if 
x has a role of y by its meaning. 
Regardless of the existence of a definition of x, this form 
enables the concept x to be a function determined by its 
meaning. What is important here is that the value of function 
determined analytically is relative to the conceptual schemes 
underlying meaning. I will adopt the critique of semantic 
ascent from Stephen Stich to show this and claim that even if 
conceptual analysis is not wrong, there are other, better 
choices for physicalism than conceptual analysis. 
In "Deconstructing the Mind"(1996), Stich refers to the 
strategy of semantic ascent: "This strategy of trading 
substantive scientific or metaphysical questions concerning the 
nature or the existence of entities for apparently equivalent 
semantic questions concerning the terms we use in talking 
about those entities."(S. Stich 1996, 55) Certainly, this strategy 
is owing to Quine's proposal of semantic ascent: "a shift from 
talk of objects to talk of words"(W.V.O. Quine 1960, sec. 56). 
Stich attacks semantic ascent by saying that reference is not 
determined only by reference theory or semantics. I will apply 
the critique of semantic ascent to the matter of conceptual 
analysis. 
Stich offers the general form of the strategy of semantic 
ascent: 
(a) (x) [ Px if and only if "P __ " refers to (or IS 
satisfied by) x ] (Stich 1996, 55). 
This form reveals the relation between the predication P and 
the referent x. P refers to x successfully if and only if P is 
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satisfied by the referent x. If there is no x satisfying the 
predicate P, Px is wrong. 
The general form (a) can be applied to the descriptive 
theory of reference. The descriptive theory of reference is a 
theory where the predicate determines its referent descriptively 
by a priori concept. Since C&J reject the descriptive definition, 
let us instead take primary intension. According to primary 
intension, we can constitute pain conceptually by folk 
semantics, because folk psychology may be the only possible 
way to specify pain conceptually. If pain rs applied to the 
general form (a) to which folk semantics is added, pain is 
something if and only if something in folk semantics satisfies 
pain. But Stich indicates that some kinds of conceptual 
intensions are circular, since there can be no answer in folk 
semantics to such a question as "Is pain the C-fiber firing 
state(CFS)?" This is because functional analysis of folk 
semantics does not contain a term such as CFS from neuro-
physiology and conceptual intension cannot answer this 
question. A possible answer may be obtained by introducing a 
new definition or specification in a circular way, such that 
pain is CFS if and only if CFS is pain. 
C&J first conceded apriorism of primary intension and then 
asserted that an a priori analysis could determine the referent 
with metaphysical necessity. If Stich succeeds in the criticism 
of semantic ascent of the descriptive theory, it implies that 
conceptual analysis can leave out important options of 
functionalism for CFS and that the first stage of conceptual 
analysis doesn't cover all options. Block dissected the 
metaphysical functionalism, a theory on the understanding of 
the nature of the mind, into two terms, Commonsense 
Functionalism (Functionalism) and Psycho-Functionalism(Block, 
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1980). Although each functionalism uses intension, the terms of 
Psycho-Functionalism are not grasped in the conceptual 
analysis that C&J prefer, as the terms of Functionalism depend 
on our common conceptual analysis. Psycho-Functionalism has 
empirical and scientific semantics in its background and 
identifies pain with the role in the level of CFS. 
2. Causal Ascent 
At stage one, I do not deny the possibility of conceptual 
analysis without definition. Rather, I propose that it is not 
everything for functionalism. However, it is insufficient only to 
say that there are other choices; therefore, I should go further 
to disconfirm that conceptual analysis is a good choice, present 
other choices as better, or at least to show that choice is 
indeterminable only by an a priori consideration. 
For this, let us move on to the critique of semantic ascent 
with the causal theory of reference. The causal theory connects 
predicates and referents by causal-historical relations 
(C-H-link-R). The causal theory modifies the general form (a): 
(x) Px if and only if C-H-link-R ("P ___ ," x) (Stich 
1996, 57). 
Stich thinks that this is not the only relation that links the 
predicate and its referent. Other relations, such as C-H-link-
R* or C-H-link-R** are also possible, as many as one wants 
(ibid.) Your name given by your parents is known to some 
through the speech of your relatives, while others know your 
name from official documents. Additionally, the name "Jade" 
can have the causal-historical relation with both jadeite and 
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nephrite. But it is reasonably possible that not all of the 
relations are right, or that some relations exclude others. Even 
if all relations can coexist, we at least need the criteria to 
choose what is proper. The matter at hand is that we cannot 
choose the proper relation only by semantics; we need other 
criteria, such as convention, or science, which are empirical, in 
order to select the correct one. 
Let us find out another example to show such a problem a 
kind of choice problem. In the case of water. first, water can 
be identified with the watery stuff by folk physics and we can 
specify water causally as the occupant of a role with 
macroscopic properties, such as transparency, odorlessness, 
tastelessness, drinkability, etc. Secondly, water is identified, by 
scientific semantics, with the causal role that comes from a 
combination of two molecules of hydrogen and one molecule of 
oxygen. Thirdly, in this way, water can be equal to the causal 
role at the atomic level. What, then, should we choose as a 
relation? Can we decide upon one relation only by semantics? 
This problem corresponds to the spread problem inherent m 
the causal theory of reference a kind of choice problem of 
causal chains. In the case of gold, which one is right among: 
a bright yellow mineral, a kind of luxurious metal, or the 
material with the atomic number 79? All of them are the 
causal meaning of gold, although some of them look 
conceptual, since the concept of gold - yellow bright metal -
could not be uniquely set up unless people encounter such 
metals causally. But once the macroscopic properties of gold 
are uniquely determined by folk physics, the cluster of the 
description of those properties becomes the concept of gold. 
What is important in the spread problem is that there are 
conceptual elements even in the causal reference. Sometimes, 
Is Conceptual Analysis Still Sustainable? 275 
we confront the choice problem of the background semantics, 
even when we take the causal theory of reference. The 
problem of semantic ascent of the causal theory stems from 
the fact that there are our conceptual elements in the causal 
reference, and that entities cannot be determined only by the 
causal theory. 
To be sure, someone might well ask why we should choose 
just one. If we are reductionists, we can say that each relation 
is reduced to another. Then, the choice problem is actually a 
pseudo-problem, since all choices are reduced to one. But the 
matter of choice is not so trivial in consciousness, to say 
nothing of mental states or mental representations. 
Eliminativists may take the matter of choice between folk 
semantics and scientific semantics seriously. 
The teaching that I extract from the critique of semantic 
ascent is the relativity of analyticity, for which I will call up 
Psycho-Functionalism once more. Functionalism and Psycho-
Functionalism can be divided in their applications to Ramsey 
sentences. Ramsey sentences depend on the theory T about 
inputs, mental states, and outputs. Once T is determined, 
Ramsey functional correlates are fixed. For example, 
X is in pain if and only if there are states which are 
caused by cell damage and which cause shrinking responses. 
X is in pain if and only if there are states which are 
caused by CFS and which cause CFS responses. 
If T is a folk theory, we have the folk specification of pain 
and Functionalism, while if T is a scientific theory, we have 
the scientific specification of pain and Psycho-Functionalism. 
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Do these Ramsey sentences not remind the general form of 
semantic ascent? Since functional analyses need functional 
intensions, the specifications of pain will look like following: 
x is pain if and only if x has the roles of pain assigned by 
the semantic theory. 
If we have folk semantics, pain is the pain role, while if we 
have scientific semantics, pain is identical with the CFS role, 
having information of CFS: receiving input information from 
other neural states and sending output infmmation to other 
neural states. 
The descriptive theory of reference defines something by a 
cluster of its descriptions in terms of folk semantics. In the 
same way, the definition of pain as having CFS's role can be 
described by a cluster of roles that CFS takes charge of. For 
example, CFS may play several roles, such as connecting b-
fiber with d-fiber, delivering such and such chemical stuff, or 
causing the neural state related to the shrinking response. 
Thus, it follows that Psycho-Functionalism also has analytical 
elements, a cluster of descriptions or roles. If a world is 
possible where folk physics is eliminated and ordinary people 
talk about everything commonly with microphysical terms, 
then that world will have conceptual analyses of scientific 
conceptual schemes. Analyticity comes from its structure to 
specify intensions with roles relative to its conceptual scheme. 
This tells us that we can have many functional analyses by 
their conceptual schemes. The choice problem of schemes 
arises in functional analyses just like the spread problem 
indicating the choice problem of causal chains. Thus, each set 
of semantics can analytically determine pain as the occupant of 
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roles. However, folk semantics is an a priori theory, while 
scientific semantics is empirical; although scientific functional 
analyses have a priori elements in their structure, the scientific 
conceptual scheme is empirical in the end. Or, if you want to 
be faithful to Stich and to eliminate all conceptual elements in 
ontology, you can reject functional analyses. Which scheme do 
you prefer? What is the criterion for choosing semantics? Can 
the choice be determined a priori? 
Finally, we reach the relativity of functional analyses and 
the indeterminacy of semantics without conceiving the negative 
worlds or facts, such as the liquid-solid inversion case. In the 
actual world, if we consider the scientific theory, we don't 
have to presuppose C&J' s primary intension. Moreover, we can 
say that the empirical semantics are more reliable since they 
depend on science. In the next section, I will try to show that 
although conceptual analysis with TDFI is a possible option, it 
is unreliable. 
3. Skepticism to Primary Intension 
Until now, I have focused on the matter of conceptual 
analysis itself. If we want to maintain conceptual analysis, we 
need to presuppose particular semantics, but we need another 
criterion than only concept to determine a conceptual scheme. 
My approach was different from that of B&S, but the moral I 
pulled out is the same. From now on, I will directly highlight 
the problematic debate. 
B&S claimed that C&J' s use of TDFI for rigidifying primary 
intension was unsuccessful. But C&J' s reply that B&S' s 
counter-examples are of negative facts which do not apply in 
our world was successful, since, without the requirement 
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excluding the negative facts, we have so many unphysical 
things or bizarre facts which do not belong to our world. 
However, the rigidity of primary intension looks superficial as 
B&S showed, although it is true that, as Chalmers said, 
B&S 1 s examples about primary intension are eliminated by the 
requirement of the minimal physical duplicate. 
I think that it is enough to present B&S 1 s boiling case in 
order to argue superficiality of primary intension, since counter 
-examples on primary intension, the liquid-solid inversion and 
having another primary intension of H20, are excluded as 
negative facts. B&S 1 s boiling case Is regarding as secondary 
intension, which isn't eliminated as a negative fact of primary 
intension. C&J claimed that the Kripkean intuition concerned 
semantics alone. Thus, they got the logical necessity of 
primary intension evaluated through possible worlds. However, 
I do not believe that this kind of necessity fully captures the 
Kripkean spirit. 
Before moving on to secondary intension, let us remake a 
counter-example about primary intension. Suppose that, in 
ancient times, there were people who believed that the sky 
was a dome and that stars were lights discharged through 
tiny holes of the dome.6) Their folk astronomy had a theory 
about stars, and they might have primary intension of stars. 
Now, primary intension of the ancient stars can be evaluated 
by scientific astronomy, so we understand that the ancient 
stars are actually immense bodies made of condensed hydrogen 
or helium gas. With TDFI, we can conclude that primary 
intension of stars of the ancient people is rigidified a priori by 
conceptual analysis, if it is the same as the scientific stars. 
6) I modified Stich's example a little(Stich 1996, 57-58). 
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But can the ancient stars really be rigidified? Of course, 
Chalmers might deny this example because it is negative. 
This type of denial is not an incorrect answer, however, it 
is not an enough solution. The folk-conceptual schemes may 
be relative to their users or conceptual schemes, and one can 
conceive of as many schemes as one wants. Even in this 
world, there may be some tribes using the same folk 
astronomy as the ancient people. Moreover, our conceptual 
schemes are changing continuously and sometimes are found 
out to be wrong. A good reason to reject this example is to 
be faithful to the Kripkean intuition about the metaphysical 
necessity. Kripke's teaching is that direct, causal, and scientific 
reference is more reliable than conceptual analysis. Even 
though C&J made conceptual analysis rigidified through 
possible worlds, conceptual analysis by folk science is not so 
reliable. Thus, not because it is a negative theory but because 
it is wrong and unreliable, we can reject the ancient 
astronomy. 
Now, let us turn to secondary intension.7) Let's call up 
Putnam's twin Earth as B&S's boiling case. We can conceive 
of a twin Earth that has XYZ-water. If XYZ-water is 
possible, then the watery stuff in the twin Earth IS no longer 
water according to secondary intension of our TDFI. 
7) Both Chalmers(l998) and jackson(2000) understand the counter-
examples of Block and Stalnaker is the same as the Putnam's version 
on secondary intension(XYZ-water). But Block and Stalnaker mainly, 
at least some, used the examples on primary intension which I 
mentioned; I understand their 'coumarone' example, which I omitted due 
to the matter of definition, is also about primary intension too, even 
though their description of the example is vague. I think that, for Block 
and Stalnaker, counter-examples using primary intension might be 
more effective and direct to kick out primary intension, but I prefer 
examples of secondary intension. 
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Reversibly, as B&S described(see 1999 Figure 1), we can 
conceive a TDFI of the twin Earth where water in that world 
is XYZ -water. Thus, we can make two frameworks of 
intension by the science of each world. Here, an absurd 
consequence occurs soon: since primary intension cannot 
distinguish XYZ -water from water, both our counterparts and 
we may call something different water simultaneously. 
However, those waters are not the same materials from the 
point of view of natural-kind term as in the case of boiling. 
This example has the same moral as B&S' s boiling case. 
Both show us that primary intension is superficial, because 
XYZ-water is not excluded but allowed by primary intension 
of our world. The instruction of the Kripkean intuition is that 
XYZ-water is not water but just pseudo-water. And a better 
theory of semantics must be able to exclude such abnormal 
instances. C&J will simply eliminate XYZ -water, since it is 
not a positive fact of our world. Still I like to resist to C&J 
because of unreliability of primary intension, even after 
admitting that it is widely held by ordinary people in our 
world that water is waterish stuff. I think the examples I 
raised and boiling case are enough to show this unreliability: 
folk physics cannot be approved for free for the reason that it 
is commonsense. Those instances tell us that Kripkean 
intuition is incomplete when it is applied to primary intension 
and that the essence of the Kripkean necessity is not just a 
matter of semantics or context for evaluation but rather a 
matter of ontology. 
4. Two-Dimensional Ascent 
Chalmers(2000), Jackson(2000), and C&J(2001) might reply 
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that TDFI needs not mind whether primary intension is 
reliable or affected by empirical facts, because what is crucial 
is framework which works out only after primary intension 
and its referent are determined in this world. So, they 
emphasize the fact in this world. The counterfactual and 
subjunctive situations should be eliminated as negative facts 
by "That's all fact" or "Nothing But" condition. Once primary 
intension and its referent are identical in the actual world, 
TDFI makes us deduce a priori from HzO to boiling. The main 
argument of C&J has two stages as we discussed: in this 
world HzO is the chief ingredient of person, and waterish stuff 
is too. From these, they conclude that the fact that water is 
HzO is a priori. 
However, their answer does not seem persuasive. They must 
insist that water is conceptually HzO, and that, therefore, we 
can deduce boiling from HzO. However, our generally accepted 
theory of natural-kind terms does not permit this conclusion; it 
cannot be analytic as we have seen in the examples of XYZ-
water and its boiling that were not excluded by "nothing but" 
condition about primary intension. I will call this point two-
dimensional (TD) ascent. Since the natural-kind term is not 
identical with primary intension, we cannot pick out HzO by 
primary intension. As Kripke taught, primary intension permits 
epistemological situations such as Putnam's twin Earth; 
therefore, HD, i.e. water, is only denoted directly without any 
mediating concept. According to this view, TDFI does not 
work out since there is no obvious consensus about fact that 
water is waterish stuff which is actually HzO. As a matter of 
fact, it is metaphysical work to confirm the existence of HzO. 
If we like to refer to water by primary intension, we commit 
a kind of semantic ascent to determine metaphysical fact by 
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semantics. C&J expected that TDFI enables us to decide 
metaphysical facts by conceptual analysis and to rigidify 
primary intension counterfactually, but they fell into TD 
ascent. Recently, Stalnaker(2001) proposed modified TDFI 
including secondary intension. In the end, the modified form 
about secondary intension is more reliable. 
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